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The public justification for nature conservation currently rests on two pillars: hedonic
(instrumental) values, and moral values. Yet, these representations appear to do little
motivational work in practice; biodiversity continues to decline, and biodiversity
policies face a wide implementation gap. In seven EU countries, we studied why
people act for nature beyond professional obligations. We explore the motivations of
105 committed actors for nature in detail using life-history interviews, and trace these
back to their childhood. Results show that the key concept for understanding
committed action for nature is meaningfulness. People act for nature because nature is
meaningful to them, connected to a life that makes sense and a difference in the world.
These eudemonic values (expressing the meaningful life) constitute a crucial third
pillar in the justification of nature conservation. Important policy implications are
explored, e.g. with respect to public discourse and the encounter with nature in
childhood.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Current values in nature policy
The public justification for nature conservation is based on two pillars. One focuses on
moral values and rests on the idea that nature has a value of its own, often called
‘intrinsic value’ (Lockwood 1999). Nature conservationists and environmental
philosophers often argue that natural entities have, or should at least be attributed,
intrinsic value to provide a solid ethical base for the protection of nature. Although the
philosophical discussion about intrinsic value still continues (see e.g. McShane 2007),
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public surveys show that the intrinsic value of biodiversity is widely acknowledged by the
general public (Buijs 2009; Butler and Acott 2007; Grendstad and Wollebaek 1998; van
den Born 2008; van den Born et al. 2001; Widegren 1998), giving this value a stable
position in the justification of nature conservation. Stressing the intrinsic value of nature
equals an ethical approach to convincing people to act on the basis of their moral
convictions.
The second pillar of biodiversity policies is based on instrumental or hedonic value.
Here, we can distinguish two branches of justification. The first is based on consumptive
pleasure and recreation; nature as a source of pleasure and health. The main message is:
being in nature is good for you. The second branch of the hedonic pillar is based on the
system-level economic benefits nature provides. Although efforts to apply economic
thinking to ecological problems originated 50 years ago (Eser et al. 2014; Gomez-
Baggethun et al. 2010), economic arguments in nature policy became truly dominant
with the introduction of the idea of ecosystem services. This is exemplified by the
enormous policy attention and hopes vested in the ecosystem services and natural capital
concepts. The European Union’s (EU) biodiversity strategy up to 2020 (European
Commission 2011) opens by stating that “Biodiversity (..) is our life insurance, giving us
food, fresh water and clean air, shelter and medicine, mitigating natural disasters, pests
and diseases and contributes to regulating the climate. Biodiversity is also our natural
capital, delivering ecosystem services that underpin our economy” (para. 1). This may
serve as a prototypical example of this trend in instrumental argumentation, which also
captures the so-called ‘cultural ecosystem services’ under the economic umbrella
(Admiraal, Musters, and de Snoo 2015; Eser et al. 2014). The underlying assumption of
stressing the economic value of nature is that this will bring societies to effective action
for nature. More in the background, moral values remain to be recognized, e.g. in the
statement that “The EU 2020 biodiversity target is underpinned by the recognition that,
in addition to its intrinsic value, biodiversity and the services it provides have significant
economic value that is seldom captured in markets” (European Commission 2011, para.
2.2). Overall, however, hedonic values continue to dominate the public discourse.
These two pillars can also be seen at the level of the EU member states. Taking the
Netherlands as an example, the advisory report of the Council of the Environment and
Infrastructure (2013, 34–37) distinguishes between functional (i.e. hedonic) and ethical
(i.e. moral) motives. Functional values are derived from the societal services of nature
such as health, recreation, production, environmental regulations and knowledge. The
report further states that the ethical values are just as important as the functional ones.
This is largely positioned as an afterthought, however; the report stresses the benefits of
policies that build on nature’s hedonic value, e.g. as expressed in the National Nature
Policy Plan (Rijksnatuurvisie 2014, 7): “The government is keen to change the image of
nature as a factor of nuisance into the image of nature as source of societal and economic
development”. A recent report produced in the Netherlands for the EU (Dammers et al.
2016) develops four ‘storylines’ for biodiversity policy development, which narrate and
visualize syntheses of values, assumptions and scales. All of them combine hedonic and
moral values of nature and humans, but with different emphases. In the storyline of
‘Cultural Identity’ for instance, we find hedonic values of nature for a Europe of small-
scale regions, combined with moral values. The storyline of ‘Allowing Nature To Find Its
Way’ is a large-scale strategy of rewilding, with moral values of nature leading and
hedonic values (economic development) in a supportive role. The storyline of ‘Going
With The Economic Flow’ is an image of large-scale capitalism based on ecosystem
services, with moral values protected by means of nature parks and additional regulation.
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The last one, ‘Working With Nature’, also combines hedonic (human well-being) and
moral values (future generations).
In short, the justification of nature policy seems to rest on the idea that people and
society can best be convinced of the importance of nature conservation and motivated to
come into action by stressing the hedonic and (more secondarily) the moral values of
nature. In the meantime, however, biodiversity in Europe continues to decline (EEA 2015),
and biodiversity policies remain a prime example of a policy implementation gap, with a
wide discrepancy between claims and actions (Johannsdottir, Cresswell, and Bridgewater
2010; Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity 2014). For industrialized
countries, we cannot attribute this to a lack of capacity; what successful biodiversity
policies would cost is only a fraction of public spending in other policy fields. What
appears to be lacking, therefore, is commitment. In spite of all hopes, these two values do
not appear to trigger enough committed action in individuals and governments.
In the background of EU bureaucracy, this realization brought about a call for
research on ‘alternative ways to value nature’, and one of the projects funded was
BIOMOT (www.biomot.eu). Considering the limited success of hedonic and moral
considerations in inspiring committed action for nature, the BIOMOT researchers quickly
intuited that other values must be at stake in truly motivating people. Searching for help
in environmental and classic Greek philosophy, eudemonic values emerged as a
promising candidate. This paper reports the result of the testing and substantiation of this
idea. The concept will be further explored in the present section, while Section 2
describes the methods and Section 3 aims to deliver the qualitative proof that eudemonic
value indeed plays the key role in energizing and shaping committed action for nature.
Building on these results, some policy implications are explored in Section 4.
1.2. Eudemonic value in theoretical literature
Hedonic (instrumental, functional, economic, etc.) and moral (intrinsic, inherent, etc.)
values are both recognized and studied in (environmental) philosophy (e.g. Callicott
1999; Hargrove 1992; Rolston 1981) and environmental and social psychology (e.g. Steg
et al. 2012; Stern and Dietz 1994; Stern et al. 1999: Berry et al. 2016); humans are
supposed to relate to nature in some, often contextual, mixture of these two types of
value. Environmental philosopher Muraca (2011), however, argues that the distinction
between intrinsic and instrumental values as made in environmental ethics is a poor one
and argues for “a greater variety of axiological categories that take into account different
moral intuitions about the relations between humans and the non-human world” (378),
focusing especially on the recognition of eudemonic (also called relational) value.
Bringing these relational values in the sphere of action for nature, Chan et al. (2016,
1462) explain that “few people make personal choices based only on how things possess
inherent worth or satisfy their preferences”, which we refer to as moral or hedonic values,
respectively. Relational values also consider the appropriateness of the relationship with
nature, including actions conducive to a good life. The ‘good’ or ‘meaningful’ life is the
key concept of eudemonic value (see below). As Chan et al. (2016) make clear,
relational/eudemonic values are not present in things but emerge out of relationships, i.e.
connectedness with other people, with society, with nature and the world. The conceptual
distinction between these three values does not exclude interactions, especially in the
dynamics of personal lives. However, since our main arguments lie at the collective level
(e.g. conservation policies), we concentrate on the distinction without referring to
interactions.
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Contrary to instrumental and intrinsic values, eudemonic values did not receive much
attention in social science or philosophy for a long time. They are still frequently
overlooked due to the dominance in the social sciences of hedonic theories such as
rational choice theory and theory of reasoned action, weakly complemented by concepts
such as social norms (e.g. Elster 1989) that represent moral values to some extent. The
notion of eudemonic value has never been completely absent, however, possibly because
it commands respect due to its origin in Socrates and Aristotle (Ryan, Huta and Deci
2008). In classic Greek thought, the concept refers to the obligation of every human
being to “live in truth to his or her daemon”, a kind of inner voice speaking about good or
bad (Norton 1976; Ryff and Singer 2008, 1). From Aristotle we derive the idea that
happiness is the ultimate goal of human existence. However, even though happiness is a
common translation for the Greek term eudaimonia,1 Aristotle’s eudaimonic happiness
does not refer to superficial satisfaction (happiness as pleasure, which is hedonic value)
but stresses the idea of a truly meaningful and well-lived life (Eser et al. 2014; Ryff and
Singer 2008). Eudemonic value therefore refers to living a meaningful or worthwhile life
(Eser et al. 2014; Muraca 2011) and is concerned with living well, living a complete life
or actualizing one’s valued potentials targeted at making a difference in the world (Deci
and Ryan 2008; Ryan, Huta and Deci 2008). This also resonates with Kaplan and
Kaplan’s (2009) conceptualization of meaningful action. According to Ryff and Singer
(2008), personal growth (i.e. self-realization) and purpose (i.e. meaning) in life are the
two pillars of eudemonia (29). Eudemonia includes a long-term perspective (Eser et al.
2014), and as O’Neill (2008) puts it, there is a major difference between life as an endless
string of feel-good moments (hedonic value) and as a story with ups and downs in the
journey towards being worth living (eudemonic value). The latter characterization allows
for an evaluation of the narrative shape of a life which the former ignores.
A meaningful life, oriented towards “continually developing and becoming, rather
than achieving a fixed state wherein all problems are solved” (Ryff and Singer 2008, 21),
thus also encompasses a drive towards learning and reflectiveness; in the pursuit of living
well, a person is “continuously engaged in reflectivity and deliberation concerning his or
her actions and aims” (Ryan, Huta and Deci 2008, 144). This is what Aristotle formulates
as “realizing one’s true potential” (Ryff and Singer 2008, 18). Baumeister and Wilson
(1996) propose that people interpret the events of their lives along four specific
dimensions: the need for purpose; the need for value and justification; the need for self-
worth, and the need for efficacy. This last need involves an essential belief that one can
make a difference in external events. An important aspect here is autonomy, closely
related to Ryan, Huta and Deci’s (2008) self-determination.
1.3. Eudemonic value in empirical research
Asah and Blahna (2013) studied conservation volunteers’ motivations and commitment
to urban nature conservation action. Results from a survey (N D 322) reveal two forms of
commitment: affective and normative. The first factor shows high adherence to items that
represent the idea that volunteering is important for their identity, that it is highly
satisfying and enjoyable, and that it ties in with reflecting upon their own lifestyle. These
items include hedonic elements, but also strong elements of eudemonic value. Normative
commitment instead represents a feeling of obligation towards volunteering as “the right
and moral thing to do” (Asah and Blahna 2013, 871). Also investigating conservation
volunteers, Guiney and Oberhausen (2009) focused on the role of connectedness to
nature as motivating action. In their survey among 145 volunteers, learning about nature
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and connectedness to nature scored highest as motivators for participating in action for
nature. They also studied the role of nature in childhood and found that this
connectedness to nature began in childhood for most of the volunteers, who became
interested in nature through “unstructured exploration” such as “constantly exploring
ponds, sloughs, woods, trees, flowers” (Guiney and Oberhausen 2009, 190). In both their
survey (N D 145) and interviews (N D 12), reconnection was mentioned; several people
were interested in nature at a young age but reconnected to nature as an adult. Finally,
Guiney and Oberhausen (2009, 190) report that “making a positive difference to the
natural world” appeared to be an important motivating factor for volunteers. All this has
little to do with hedonic pleasures or moral obligations, and much with feelings of
connectedness with nature as part of a meaningful life, i.e. eudemonic value.
1.4. From values to action
The volunteering literature mentioned in the preceding section already shows that there is
a strong connection between eudemonic values and real action. Many scholars emphasize
the importance of human values for explaining behaviour (e.g. Axelrod 1994; Stern 2000;
Muhar et al. 2017). Values can serve as a “guiding principle in the life of a person”
(Schwartz 1992, 37). Therefore, in this paper we consider values as motivating or driving
action. Nolt (2006) explains that philosophers often forget that the step from good (a
condition or assumption) to ought (an urge or command to act) is not self-evident; it is a
step that needs justification, or as O’Neill (1992) writes, it is itself in need of an ought
premise. Considering environmental ethics, and in particular action for nature, some
justifications (some ought premises) are more promising than others. Indeed, one of the
few promising justifications when it comes to nature-oriented action is the so-called
Aristotelian ought, the urge to engage in a project of caring for nature. However, this
justification is only acceptable on the condition that one also accepts the underlying idea
that doing this is a necessary act of self-transcendence, the urge to connect, necessary to
live a life of significance (Nolt 2006, 371–372). This view and this solution refer to the
same notions as our idea of eudemonia, i.e. the predominance of the notions of care, self-
transcendence, connectedness and significance. This need for a life of significance has
been demonstrated to drive action for nature (Molinario 2015). Against this background,
as well as based on the volunteering literature, our concept of eudemonic value includes
feelings of connectedness. The hypothesis tested in this paper is that committed action for
nature is energized and shaped by the way people feel connected with nature as part of a
meaningful life.
2. Methods
The data for this paper were gathered in the context of BIOMOT, an EU FP7 project
(www.biomot.eu). The results are based on 105 life history interviews with committed
actors for nature in seven European countries (Belgium, Finland, Germany, Italy,
Slovenia, the Netherlands and United Kingdom).
2.1. Selection and number of interviewees
In this paper, we focus on committed action for nature. ‘Committed’ means that the actor
devotes much more energy, thought and persistence to nature than would be necessary
for reasons of job, income, tradition or reputation. The lives of committed actors are
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‘lives for nature’ to a significant degree. Committed actors for nature were selected by
first distinguishing between governmental, business or civil society (e.g. schools, nature
NGOs and media) actors. Within each actor group, between 8 and 12 highly committed
actors were selected per country on the basis of their public reputation, visibility and
work. Some interviewees (n D 18) were eventually dropped because they were less
committed than initially thought or less focused on biodiversity issues (e.g. more on
general sustainability issues). Finally, 105 were included in the analysis as actors
committed to nature.
2.2. Interview structure
Both the long-term perspective and the aspect of reflectiveness demand a methodology
that gives enough room for the interviewee to include these elements. Life stories can be
a good vehicle for people to make sense of their lives (Bauer, McAdams, and Pals 2008,
84). Stories and narratives can be especially useful in conveying the coherence and the
meaning of lives (Bauer, McAdams, and Pals 2008, 100), and can therefore play an
important role in the scientific study of human behaviour and experience (McAdams
2001). For the interviews, a semi-structured interview guide was used (Flick 2011),
followed by a sorting of cards displaying different motivations. The life-history interview
preceded the card sorting to create a context in which interviewees are stimulated to
ruminate about their motivations. During the interview, the motivations of the
interviewee to act for nature conservation were explored in detail. The interviewer and
interviewee first came to a description of the main goals that the interviewee aims to
achieve with respect to action for nature, subsequently exploring the interviewee’s life
story in which the roots and development of their main interest is traced back to their
childhood and the specific environments of their past, ordered roughly as youth (0–15
years), adolescence and early adulthood (15–25 years) and later life (from 25 years until
the present). After each qualitative interview, we asked the interviewee to rank 20 cards
describing motivations for taking action for nature. In this paper, we report the findings
of the qualitative interviews; the results of the card ranking are reported in Admiraal
et al. (2017).
2.3. Data analysis
The interviews were transcribed verbatim and analysed in a three-step procedure,
standardized and agreed on by all countries. The first step was to code the interview data
descriptively (Punch 2005), in order to mark and describe important passages. Important
passages were related to the main themes of the project (e.g. role of nature in childhood,
peak experiences) or to themes emerging out of the interviews. The second step was
inferential coding, iteratively categorizing the material into more accurate and
meaningful units. In this phase of analysis, relationships and patterns in and between
interviews are sought, based on the codes applied in the first step of the analysis. Finally,
we checked whether these emergent themes and patterns confirmed hypotheses from the
literature (see Section 1), e.g. whether interviewees mentioned a drive towards learning.
Throughout the second and third steps, we made use of memoing, i.e. “the theorizing
write-up of ideas about codes and their relationships” (Punch 2005, 201). In order to
standardize this procedure, we discussed this method of working with memos during a
coding workshop for the interviewers, and we provided them with literature on this topic.
After each country team finished their initial analysis, another workshop was organized
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to discuss and compare the findings on the main emergent themes. The goal was to
discuss similarities and possible differences between countries, supported by the
standardized memoing procedure.
Every country team wrote a report in which the results of their interviews, based on
this three-step procedure, were described. The analysis in this paper is based on the
results of these seven country-level analyses of interviews. Where necessary, the
interview transcripts were checked to confirm interpretations.
We did not analyse possible quantitative differences between gender, sector, age or
country. Rather, we focused fully on a qualitative, more ‘hermeneutic’ analysis of the
interviews, aiming to establish a deeper, overall interpretation.
3. Results
3.1. Results of the interviews
In this section, the results of the 105 life-history interviews with highly committed actors for
nature are described, starting briefly with their views on nature, the role of nature in
childhood and the aspect of connectedness. Second, the role of curiosity and learning is
briefly discussed. Finally, the value of a meaningful life is described as revealed through the
way interviewees spoke about what motivates their actions. The codes of the quotations
refer to the country of the interviewee (UK for United Kingdom, BEL for Belgium, GER for
Germany, SLOV for Slovenia, FIN for Finland, ITA for Italy and NL for the Netherlands)
and the number of the interviewee, as used in the transcribed interviews.
3.1.1. The role of nature in childhood
The committed actors for nature we interviewed have many different visions of what
nature means to them. There is nature as space: as freedom, openness, as the encounter
with the truly other, that which makes us fully human. There is nature as species: the
wolves, the creatures of the sea, the birds, etc. There is nature as stories: stories of
landscapes, stories of people, stories of happiness, and, quite often for our actors, stories
of food. One interviewee described how nature meant “just the openness… I mean
contact with nature and losing yourself in it” (UK3). For other interviewees nature was
“something to have adventures in” (UK15), being outdoors, being free as a child without
parental supervision (BEL11).
One interviewee who grew up in a little village frequently went to a local peatland as a
child to hunt with their father, and expressed the importance of this peatland to them as a
child as “the emptiness, being desolate, not being distracted by other things, one can sit
there quietly and look around (…), thinking about things. When I had personal
difficulties, I took a walk in the peatland” (GER17). They later studied peatlands as a
scientist and became socially active for the protection of peatlands.
In the early lives of the majority of the interviewees, nature was present to an often
astonishing degree: “I grew up in the forest”, as several of them put it, or as others said
“the indoors hardly existed” (NL23). Other variations were “always outdoors”, “on the
beach everyday” or “had to be outside all the time”. Many interviewees relate this
presence of nature and spending time in nature in their childhood to their later
motivations to act for nature (Tanner 1980; Chawla 1998). A German interviewee, active
for the protection of old crop varieties, at age 14 independently roamed the area where
they grew up, “sometimes even the whole day”. When asked for the main motivations
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behind their committed action for nature, this interviewee responded: “For me it was
definitely the wish to get closer to nature and to be active within nature, you know… That
has always been my passion. [Growing up] I was outside a lot, ran a lot, went hiking,
started to collect herbs and to see, what is this, what is growing there” (GER3).
Most of these children had a high and autonomous drive to connect to nature, much
more, for instance, than their siblings. Many interviewees feel this drive has been innate
and connected with their earliest memories; “nature has been part of me all my life”
(NL33). Although this notion of connectedness was important for their motivations, they
were not always specific regarding to what they felt connected: “Nature feels like a part
of me” (ITA17) and “I’m connected to the natural world” (UK5). Often this
connectedness with nature grew during their lives and ties in strongly with a curiosity for
nature and the desire to learn about nature in later life (see Section 3.1.2.). This
connectedness and curiosity is often mentioned as the main motivations for their actions
for nature. Another large group of interviewees state that the role of nature in childhood
is important for their connectedness with nature in later life, but that they were not aware
of this connectedness in childhood because they felt like it was normal and beyond
question that nature was there.
A general pattern in our interviewees’ stories about nature is a ‘life spiral’: a
reconnection with the intense encounter with nature in early youth energizes and directs
committed action for nature in adult life, sometimes along a fast or slow but fluent path,
sometimes after many diversions, crises and epiphanies.2 This is true for both actors for
whom the notion of connectedness with nature in childhood was more explicitly
expressed in the interview, and those for whom it was more implicit and (initially) taken
for granted.
3.1.2. Curiosity and learning
Most interviewees were fascinated by nature, sometimes very early on but ever more
intensely during their teenage years. Objects of curiosity could be anything: insects,
mammals, birds, plants, forests, moors, right up to the working of ecosystems. Guiney
and Oberhausen (2009) also found an important role for learning and connectedness, but
for many of our interviewees, they were interrelated: knowledge acts as a vehicle to
connect them with nature. The desire to know seems to have much in common with the
desire to connect, expressed by one interviewee as “when you learn about nature, you are
able to enjoy things you did not see before (…) you can experience nature much more
deeply” (NL27) or by another as “all species have a relationship with us and the more
you learn about this, the richer your world is” (NL15). A German interviewee active in
wolf protection stated very explicitly that “the thirst of knowledge is the thing that had
pushed me” (GER13). Once curiosity is aroused, it often becomes a lifelong learning
process: “I was on a massive learning curve (…) suddenly it was like a whole new world
out there which was quite surprising, and after that I just never stopped learning” (UK1).
We could detect a pattern in which a connectedness with nature developed in childhood
became stronger in adulthood along with a strong curiosity, like for this interviewee: “the
curiosity to know about nature has channelled into the study of the wolf” (ITA13).
3.1.3. Meaningful life
The pursuit of a meaningful life is crucial for understanding committed action for nature.
Among our interviewees, we distinguish two broad groups of actors, namely those that
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mention meaningfulness explicitly and those who refer to it implicitly. We start by giving
some examples of the first category. One person for whom a meaningful life is a key
notion in their life story is a Dutch interviewee. This person lost track of the authentic
life course in industry jobs, and to make a difference they made the risky choice to start
their own foundation that re-established their connectedness with nature: the “long
journey home”, and “we do not need nature to be happy but we need nature to be fully
human on all levels” (NL17). Other interviewees also talk about making a difference in
the world and link this explicitly to living a worthwhile life, noting that working with
nature helps to give them a sense of living a worthwhile life “because you’re making a
difference, you’re helping protect it and to keep those good things” (UK3) or that “living
a life that is worthwhile…in terms of… making a difference…I spoke of that right at the
beginning, wanting to do something…I found the thing that I can do that makes my life
worthwhile…I will leave the world in a better place through my actions than I found it”
(UK25). Closely related to Aristotle’s idea of eudemonia, one interviewee says: “you can
only look back on your life… with any sort of sense of worth if you try and live in a
way that is worthwhile”, and that “this is achieved by always trying to do the right
thing” (UK19). The value and justification dimension of Baumeister and Wilson (1996)
is also mentioned: “nature conservation and environment are (…) mentally very
important to me, they kind of justify living, so that I feel that I am doing something in
my life that justifies my being here” (FIN17) and “I want to do something that is
meaningful to me and I’m happy that my work is meaningful and in accordance with my
values. I’m happy that I have been able to have work in which I can fulfil my own
values” (FIN23).
Most interviewees did not mention ‘meaningful life’ in those exact words, but many
implicit references can be found. Interviewees frequently expressed (1) a life-directing
desire to make a difference in the world (Deci and Ryan 2008; Ryan, Huta, and Deci
2008; Guiney and Oberhausen 2009); (2) an interpretation of the notion of living a
worthwhile or meaningful life in terms of fulfilling one’s potential (Deci and Ryan 2008;
Ryan, Huta, and Deci 2008; Ryff and Singer 2008); and (3) an active awareness of the
need for actions to fit into the greater life-story (O’Neill, 2008). We discuss these
expressions in this order.
The understanding of living a meaningful life as a life-directing desire to make a
difference in the world was most commonly expressed in the simple statement of a desire
to ‘make a difference’ or ‘do something’. Examples include: “I like to do anything that
makes the difference, if I think that that will achieve that or that it will have a good
result, then I will put everything into it, everything I’ve got” (UK1) or “A valuable life is
that you add something, that you act significantly” (NL7). People are strongly convinced
that making a difference is what they must and can do: “with the certainty that I’m doing
something positive for the world, I mean almost a missionary” (ITA7) and “I realized
that I can, with other people, change things” (ITA21). Another actor (NL21) did not
speak explicitly on this level of reflection, but their actions make clear that the desire to
make a difference for nature and sustainability is the central principle of their life, e.g.
investing a decade in ecological study and then dropping this immediately after
discovering that studying nature does not help nature very much.
The second interpretation of the notion of living a worthwhile or meaningful life was
in terms of fulfilling one’s potential. For example, for one Italian interviewee nature was
neither present nor important up till they were 20 years old. This person did not have any
aspirations beyond making money, but a peak experience was a turning point, leading to
a realization of the importance of nature and that everything comes from the land: “I
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learned the importance of food and the importance of nature, I started to experience
thoughts that I never had before, I thus started to open myself…” and “the turning point
was that I became aware of my own capacities” (ITA5). Another example is a life story
involving a peak experience in childhood, through which the interviewee became aware
of nature and the beauty of the sea and the island where they grew up. But during their
adolescence and early adulthood, they experienced a period of separation: living in the
city, feeling alone and having no contact with nature. At the age of 25, they took a free
diving course and became part of the National team, winning many competitions. But
they realized that these new friends “don’t care about the sea, I mean its condition, the
pollution, what was important to them was just having the best performance, winning
cups, with no care for all the rest” (ITA21). After this personal crisis, this person had
another peak experience that they called a life-changing moment. While underwater, a
turtle “was in trouble, she was really big, (…) I carried her on my back and reached my
car, it was not easy. Later, I dove with her when she was set free and that moment really
changed my life, it awakened the desire to strive for the protection of nature”, and “that
call to commitment, it was really important, because it raised the awareness of my ability
to do something” (ITA21).
This wish to fulfil one’s potential demands a high level of reflection on one’s
personality and behaviour. Ryff and Singer (2008, 22) note that having a reflective stance
towards life plays an important role in achieving happiness through active engagement in
life. Interviewees refer to always being able to question themselves and become true to
their potential: “the meaning of life to me is to evolve and to be always able to question
oneself and to have a better behaviour for the collectivity and for oneself” (BEL2) and “it
[his work] has been great…because the work has been a stimulus for me to develop as a
person and become more true to myself and my potential” (UK25). When asked for their
main motivations, an interviewee active in Slovenian nature protection referred clearly to
this idea of fulfilling one’s potential, going back to the ancient Greeks and their idea of
excellence: “but first be an excellent person yourself and then you will be able to make
the right decisions” and “do good things, avoid bad things, or contribute so that when
you die, you and your community, or the circle you can influence, will be at least a little
bit better that it was because of your existence” (SLO21).
A last aspect of meaningful life refers to the notion of having a high consciousness of
life’s plan (Bauer, McAdams, and Pals 2008): “You have to make choices”, “I am always
thinking, I always … have a plan” (NL30) and “I would like to (..) ask myself about my
existence and how to raise it to a higher level, ethical, and in terms of quality of
existence” (SLO21). This consciousness can be a struggle, but is recognized by the
interviewees as important: “It was a part of my alternative way of thinking that came
about at some point that I don’t have to think about having a career (…) why should I try
to live up to other people’s expectations and live according to norms that are created by
other people (..) So that’s what I thought of (..) I realized, I do have choices. I
acknowledged that I don’t need to worry, that I can throw myself into this situation and
that it was like jumping into the unknown (…) It was quite an important process”
(FIN17).
4. Conclusion and policy implications
Before we draw our conclusions and give some policy recommendations, we first reflect
briefly on our methodological choices.
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As a consequence of our sampling approach, which involved finding both highly
visible and highly committed actors for nature, the sample is not spread perfectly over
countries, age and gender. As a result, our sample might not be fully representative for all
highly committed actors, for instance by possibly missing some less visible actors.
However, the robustness of the main patterns in our findings across all our interviewees,
including across countries and sectors, was striking, which gives us confidence that the
core findings of this paper, i.e. the importance of nature in childhood, connectedness with
nature and eudemonic values, are applicable for highly committed actors for nature in
general.
Further support for the robustness of our findings is the fact that they were confirmed
by the quantitative card sorting exercise (reported in Admiraal et al. 2017). This card
sorting showed that the top ranking motivations for nature action aggregated into two
groups: (1) living a meaningful life (living a worthwhile life and curiosity and learning)
and (2) moral values (future generations and value in itself). This confirms that
eudemonic values play a crucial role in motivating nature conservation action, whether
these motivations are elicited through qualitative or quantitative methods.
Despite ongoing efforts to motivate politicians and the public in Europe for nature
conservation, biodiversity continues to decline. The existing discourse, in which moral
and especially instrumental arguments for nature conservation are used, appears to be
insufficient to motivate committed people into action for nature, because these arguments
are not in concordance with their main motivations. This study shows that non-hedonic
values have a crucial role to play: ‘a meaningful life’, including being connected to
nature and making a difference in the world, and ‘curiosity and learning’ are very
important drivers for committed action for nature. These values are called relational
values (Chan et al. 2016) or eudemonic values (Deci and Ryan 2008; Eser et al. 2014;
Ryan, Huta, and Deci 2008) and are substantially different from instrumental and
intrinsic values. While our results focus on highly committed actors, Chan et al. (2016,
1463) refer to a broader group when they note that “the usual framings of instrumental
and intrinsic values fail to resonate with many lay-people and decision-makers”. It is
therefore important for nature organizations and policy-makers to address these
eudemonic values when keeping committed people motivated or trying to motivate
people into action for nature. Under the condition of feeling connected to nature, most
often developed strongly in childhood, meaningful life is a strong driver for action.
Connectedness to nature is a crucial building block for action for nature.
This brings us to nature conservation policy. We strongly believe, given the findings
of this study, that nature conservation policies should be immediately grounded in
three – not two – foundational values. We are willing to protect nature because: (1)
nature is meaningful in the lives of people and communities; (2) nature has its own right
to exist; and (3) nature brings with it many socio-economic benefits, such as ecosystem
services (De Groot et al 2016). But how can nature conservation policy, in which the
economic discourse is currently so dominant, take this new pillar of eudemonic values
into account? We present three policy recommendations, inferred from our results. First,
nature conservation policies need to contribute to reforming and upscaling nature
education from passive-indoor to active-outdoor modes of learning in order to connect
children to nature as early as possible in their (often urbanized) lives. Existing initiatives
from organizations such as schools and day care already contribute to this development
and must be fostered. Second, nature conservation policies should facilitate connections
between people and nature, and not hamper them, as is often the case now. And third, we
need a new public discourse on nature, in which instrumental rationality is less dominant,
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and in which a new language of engagements and connections is unlocked. Since
governments do play important roles in the emergence, maintenance and dissolution of
public discourses, they have a task here as well. Below, we briefly elaborate upon each
recommendation.
4.1. Building connectedness: encounters with nature in childhood
Committed actors for nature cannot simply be ‘bred’. But there is a basic prerequisite, a
childhood feature that stands out as essential for basically all committed actors in our
study: the intense, mainly unsupervised encounter with nature in childhood. Previous
studies have shown that individual experiences during childhood are essential for the
development of a relationship with nature, and for inspiring action for nature later in life
(Chawla 2009). Access to nature for children is crucial, especially when more and more
children are growing up in urban areas, making encounters with nature increasingly rare.
This urbanization process, together with parents’ current obsession with perceived
‘danger’, prevents children from roaming freely in nature without supervision (Louv
2005), while our study confirms that such experiences are of utmost importance for
building connectedness with nature (e.g. Burgess and Mayer-Smith 2011). Although we
acknowledge that this is particularly true for highly committed actors, the above studies
cover all actors and not only committed ones. Therefore, nature education – as part of
nature conservation policy – should be reformed from overly passive indoor curricula
towards active forms of engaging children (and adults) with nature outdoors. This is
already practiced on a small scale, but this study shows the need for a huge upscaling
effort in Europe, if not worldwide.
4.2. Building energies for nature: autonomy/role of government
In current society, a general trend towards decentralization exists; governments
increasingly transfer decision-making power and responsibilities to sub-national
authorities, organizations and even individuals (Arts, Buijs, and Verschoor 2017; Lemos
and Agrawal 2006). Such delegation leads to new actor coalitions in policy making,
including nature conservation policy (Buijs, Mattijssen and Arts 2014). Citizen initiatives
are becoming more important for public policy-making, and governments could – or
maybe even should – take an active role in stimulating such initiatives (Mattijsen et al.
2016). Our study reveals that highly committed actors for nature show high levels of
autonomy while acting for nature. To facilitate ‘a green energetic society’, as Hajer
(2011) terms it, government should, therefore, enable such ‘green champions’ to play a
leading role in these transformation processes instead of limiting them through rigid and
bureaucratic rules (Buizer, Arts, and Westerink 2015). Of course, regulations will always
remain necessary to protect nature against unrestrained market forces, excessive human
densities and so on. Yet, within these limits, there is a need for governments to support
practices in which humans and nature can meet one another, and to incorporate such
possibilities in social practices and communities. It is therefore crucial that governments
become much more responsive to what motivates its citizens (Hajer 2011). Part of that
should be, in light of the findings of this study, the facilitation of practices that strengthen
citizens’ connectedness, meaningfulness and pleasure related to nature instead of
prioritizing economic incentives for changing human behaviour towards nature (Shove
2010). Besides the aforementioned active-outdoor modes of nature education, it is
important to integrate these nature policy considerations into other policy sectors, such as
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the greening of urban areas and industrial sites, connecting health policies to nature
conservation, supporting nature-inclusive agriculture, and abolishing rules, regulations
and adverse incentives that hamper such developments.
4.3. Building public language
Public discourse is completely dominated by ‘rational’, economic language. Languages,
stories, narratives, framings or imageries of connectedness with nature, are instead
relegated to the private domain. The instrumental or hedonic pillar brings forth its own
language, with words like natural capital, markets, ecosystem services, value-added
production, cost-benefit analysis and profits, a language with which policymakers feel
familiar and comfortable. Although such instrumental discourses have their own merits
for nature conservation policy, our results highlight the importance of the third pillar
addressed in this paper, which requires another language. Hence, in order to bridge the
implementation gap, we need a public discourse that does not crowd out personal
commitments (Neuteleers and Engelen 2015) but fosters them, makes them part of public
life, and in doing so multiplies them. This will not be easy, and research into the
languages used by committed actors in green citizen initiatives will be helpful to get a
better insight into the words and languages that foster connectedness and commitment
and unlock eudemonic values.
To conclude, besides a moral and an instrumental pillar, we need to include a third
pillar into the justification of nature conservation and its policy domain; a pillar based on
eudemonic values. In order to close the gap between current intentions and efforts to
conserve biodiversity, and the commitment to really implement the principles, goals and
targets of nature policy, said policy should resonate much more with the motivations of
citizens. The main conclusion of our large empirical study in Europe is that committed
actors for nature devote their time and energy to nature because they feel connected to it
and because it gives meaning to their life. Moreover, (re)building this missing pillar is not
only crucial to keep the highly committed actors motivated, but may also inspire people
and communities to reconnect with nature. These values should therefore be recognized,
acknowledged and strengthened by both nature organizations and governments.
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Notes
1. ‘Eudaimonia’, derived from Aristotle, is used in philosophical texts; we use the more common
spelling ‘eudemonia’ in this paper.
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2. Peak experience or environmental epiphany is “an experience in which one’s perception of the
essential meaning of their relationship to nature shifts in a meaningful manner” (Vining and
Merrick 2012, 497).
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